Using an event study approach, we examine nancial markets' reactions to the publication of the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment of banks in the euro area. Our results suggest that banks' stock market prices and CDS spreads generally did not react to the publication of the results of the Comprehensive Assessment.
Introduction
On October the European Central Bank (ECB) published the outcomes of the so-called Comprehensive Assessment of banks in the euro area (and Lithuania) . A year before, on October , the ECB had announced the assessment in preparation for its new task as banking supervisor in the euro area. e Comprehensive Assessment consisted of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) and a stress test. Its aim was to scour banks' books for hidden problems, test their ability to withstand crises, and force weak banks to raise more capital.
e ECB hopes that the AQR and the stress test will clear up lingering doubts about the health of banks in the euro area, so that banks can raise funds more easily and increase lending. As ECB President Mario Draghi put it: "We expect that this assessment will strengthen private sector con dence in the soundness of euro area banks and in the quality of their balance sheets. " Arguably, previous stress tests in the euro area failed to restore con dence because some banks that passed them soon therea er collapsed (Ewing, ) . In stress tests the implications for individual banks' nancial positions under several macroeconomic scenarios are examined, taking the banks' exposures and business models into account. ese tests are run by all banks involved based on common scenarios and an identical forecast window making results highly comparable across banks (Petrella and Resti, ) . Some previous studies examined the impact of EBA stress tests on nancial markets. Using a similar event study approach as the current paper, Petrella and Resti ( ) nd signi cant market responses to the EBA stress test in . ey conclude that stress tests produce valuable information for market participants and can play a role in mitigating bank opacity. Ellahie ( ) studies equity and credit market data of Eurozone banks that took part in the stress tests in and . His ndings indicate that information asymmetry and information uncertainty measures were not signi cantly a ected by stress test announcements but that information asymmetry declined a er the disclosure of the stress test results, while information uncertainty increased. Cardinali and Nordmark ( ) report that the announcements of the stress test and the clari cation of the methodology in were relatively uninformative to markets. In contrast, they nd that the disclosure in by EBA of the stress test methodology was highly informative for all stress-tested banks. Likewise, Beltratti ( ) argues that the EBA stress test produced new information, as investors could not a priori distinguish between capitalized and under-capitalized banks. Finally, Candelon and Sy ( ) compare the market impact of all US and EU-wide stress tests performed from to . ey nd that the EU exercise is the only EU-wide stress test that resulted in a signi cant negative market reaction. is paper examines the impact of the announcement of the Comprehensive Assessment and the publication of its outcomes on banks' stock prices and CDS spreads. Our results suggest that stock prices and CDS spreads generally did not react to the publication of the results.
is conclusion also holds for banks with a capital shortfall. Only for banks in some countries do we nd weak evidence for (mixed) e ects on stock prices, while CDS spreads for German banks declined.
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/ /html/pr .en.html. As pointed out by Goldstein ( ), a er the EU-wide stress test performed by the European Banking Authority (EBA), Irish Life and Permanent had to be placed in a government-restructuring program even though it had a very high risk-based ratio in the test. Likewise, Dexia (a French-Belgian bank) and Bankia (based in Spain) also passed the test but soon therea er required a taxpayernanced bailout. e paper is structured as follows. Section outlines the Comprehensive Assessment. Section describes our methodology and section presents the results. Section o ers our conclusions.
e Comprehensive Assessment
In the rst phase of the assessment, the Asset Quality Review, teams of examiners pored over the books of the most important banks in the euro area, covering approximately percent of total bank assets (Ewing, ). e aim of the review was to uncover hidden problems, such as bad loans that banks had not disclosed. e AQR conducted by the ECB and national competent authorities (NCAs) examined whether assets were properly valued on banks' balance sheets as on December . It made banks comparable across national borders by applying common de nitions for previously diverging concepts and a uniform methodology when assessing balance sheets.
In the second phase of the assessment, banks were subjected to a stress test intended to measure banks' ability to withstand a crisis, such as a severe recession or turmoil in global nancial markets (Ewing, ). e stress test used both a baseline and an adverse scenario for testing banks' resilience to stress. In the baseline scenario, the EU economy develops in line with the European Commission's economic projections up to ; in the adverse scenario, macroeconomic developments clearly deteriorate. Banks were required to maintain a minimum CET ratio of percent under the baseline scenario (as for the AQR) and a minimum CET ratio of . percent under the adverse scenario.
e AQR showed that as of endthe carrying values-or book values-of banks' assets need to be adjusted by e billion, which will be re ected in the banks' accounts or prudential requirements. Furthermore, using a standard de nition for non-performing exposures (any obligations that are days overdue, or that are impaired or in default), the review found that banks' non-performing exposures increased by e billion to a total of e billion. e assessment found a capital shortfall of almost e billion at (mainly small and medium-sized) banks (see Table ) . Most of these banks were located in Southern Europe: nine banks are Italian, while three banks come from Cyprus and Greece, two from Belgium and Slovenia, and one from Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Twelve of the banks covered their capital shortfall by increasing capital by e billion in . e Comprehensive Assessment also showed that a severe scenario would deplete the banks' top-quality, loss-absorbing Common Equity Tier (CET ) capital by about e billion. is would result in the banks' median CET ratio decreasing by percentage points from . to . percent.
Most market participants consider the Comprehensive Assessment much more credible than previous EBA stress tests, but some academics are critical. According to de Groen ( ), one weakness of the Comprehensive Assessment is that the ECB focused purely on the CET ratio, which is based on risk-weighted assets. de Groen has calculated capital shortfalls under several alternative criteria, one of them being the leverage Capital shortfalls should be covered within six months for those identi ed in the AQR or the baseline stress test scenario, and within nine months for those identi ed in the adverse stress test scenario. Shortfalls revealed by the AQR and the baseline stress test scenario may only be covered by Common Equity Tier (CET ) capital instruments. e use of Additional Tier (AT ) capital instruments to cover shortfalls arising from the adverse stress test scenario is limited, depending on the trigger point of conversion or write-down.
ratio. His calculations suggest that banks would require almost e billion in total to meet the threshold of percent minimum leverage ratio under the adverse scenario. According to the results of de Groen ( ), several underperforming banks have their headquarters in northern Europe, with ve banks based in Germany, four banks each in Belgium and France, and three banks in the Netherlands failing to meet the threshold under the adverse scenario. Likewise, in their stress test Acharya and Ste en ( a,b) report much higher capital shortfalls than the ECB. Acharya and Ste en ( b) conclude that the "regulatory stress test outcomes are potentially heavily a ected by the discretion of national regulators in measuring what is 'capital' , and especially by the use of risk-weighted assets in calculating the prudential capital requirement. is highlights the importance of using multiple benchmark leverage ratios, such as the market-based approach we employ, and simple leverage ratio (which is not a ected by regulatory risk weights). "
Method
We use equity returns and CDS spreads of banks that have participated in the Comprehensive Assessment. Not all banks are listed. Likewise, for some banks CDS are not available. Table indicates which banks are taken into account in our analysis. Data were obtained from Bloomberg.
Before the ECB announced the outcomes of the Comprehensive Assessment several estimates of capital shortages of European banks were published. Acharya and Ste en ( a), for example, nd an EU-wide capital shortfall of hundreds of billions of euros. In their estimates, the largest part of that aggregate shortfall resides with large French banks. If such expectations had been priced in, the publication of the outcomes of the Comprehensive Assessment, which suggested much lower capital shortfalls, may have surprised nancial markets.
To examine whether stress tests have caused abnormal movements in equity or CDS markets we follow previous studies, such as Petrella and Resti ( ) and Morgan et al. ( ), and use an event study methodology. To measure the impact of an event we set the abnormal return of a security as the di erence between the actual (ex post) return and the normal return over the relevant event window. Normal returns are estimated using the following market model:
where R i ,t is the daily return of equity of bank i at time t, and R m,t is the return of a market portfolio. We use the MSCI Europe Index as proxy for the market portfolio. In addition, we employ daily data on -year senior CDS spreads for a subset of the banks. We regress the CDS spread of bank i at time t on the overall index and employ the iTraxx Europe Index provided by Bloomberg as proxy for a market portfolio in the CDS market. e residuals or abnormal returns (AR) implied by the market model are given by:
where the circum ex indicates that the parameter concerned is estimated. Next, following Morgan et al. ( ), we sum the abnormal returns over the relevant window around the event date (T) to compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). While we experimented with windows of various sizes, we follow Morgan et al. ( ) and focus on a -day window (-,+ ). Our estimation windows for equity returns and CDS spreads consists of trading days, i.e. the (-,-) time interval, where T = is the event date (i.e. the announcement of the assessment or the publication of the outcomes). is window is su cient to conduct an event study using daily data (MacKinlay,
). e t-statistics obtained from the estimation are adjusted for event clustering and event induced variance following Kolari and Pynnonen ( ). ese adjusted tstatistics are employed to test whether the CAR signi cantly di ers from zero.
Results
Tables and show the nancial market reactions to the announcement of the Comprehensive Assessment and the publication of its outcomes, respectively. e tables display the abnormal returns cumulated over a period of three (or more) trading days and averaged across groups of banks. We test whether banks have CARs that are signi cantly di erent from zero during our event windows. As Table shows, the announcement of the assessment led to a decline in the average CARs of all banks of . percent but this e ect is not signi cant. Also the CDS-spreads were not signi cantly a ected. e results do not suggest that stock prices and CDS-spreads of gap and no-gap banks reacted systematically di erent. e same conclusion holds for the publication of the outcomes. Overall, stocks and spreads did not react on the day that the results of the assessment were released, and this holds both for gap banks and no-gap banks.
Next, we di erentiate between banks located in two groups of countries, namely the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the other countries in the euro area. As Tables and show, the results for both groups of countries are similar: both the announcement and the publication of the outcomes of the Comprehensive Assessment generally did not a ect nancial markets.
Next, we turn to the results per country. Using our standard event window, there is some evidence that the Comprehensive Assessment had an e ect on equity returns and CDS spreads. e announcement of the Comprehensive Assessment a ected stock prices of Belgian and Portuguese banks negatively (see Table ) .
e announcement does not seem to have had a signi cant e ect on stock prices of banks in other countries. In Spain there was a negative announcement e ect for CDS spreads and in the Netherlands a positive e ect. As to the market reaction to the publication of the results of the Comprehensive Assessment we see a mixed picture (see Table ) . CARs were a ected positively for Austrian and Portuguese banks but negatively for the We have considered di erent event windows as well: (-, ), ( ,+ ), (-, ), ( ,+ ), (-,+ ), (-, ), ( ,+ ), (-,+ ), (-, ), ( ,+ ), and (-,+ ). We present ndings for some of these windows in our tables.
In the presence of event clustering cross-correlation among stocks may lead to the over rejection of the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns. Not all recent event studies adjust for clustering (e.g. Candelon and Sy, ), but in our view it is the proper procedure. See also Amici et al. ( ), Fratianni and Marchionne ( ), and Elyasiani et al. ( ). If we take somewhat longer symmetric windows, i.e. (-,+ ), (-,+ ), and (-,+ ), we nd similar results. Although the CARs a er the publication of the results of the Comprehensive Assessment increase in most windows, they are only signi cantly di erent from zero at the ten percent level for the stock market for a (-,+ ) window; for CDS spreads the results are always insigni cant.
Using a longer window generally does not lead to di erent results. Again the CARs increase, but they are not signi cantly di erent from zero; only for the (-, + ) window do we nd a signi cant e ect in the stock market, but only at the ten percent level.
Irish banks in our sample. News articles obtained from the Dow Jones Factiva database indicate that stock prices of banks for which markets expected worse results than reported increased. In other circumstances, stocks declined mainly due to economic news. For CDS spreads there is less evidence of a market reaction a er the publication of the results of the assessment (see Table ) . An exception is the decline in spreads for German banks, which may re ect that markets were positively surprised that almost all German banks passed the Comprehensive Assessment.
For longer event windows, the results as shown in Tables and suggest stock market reactions for some countries (most notably Austria, Belgium, France, and Spain). For example, considering an event window of (-,+ ), i.e. ve trading days, the negative market reactions of Belgian, French, and Spanish banks are signi cant at the percent level. Considering event windows of (-,+ ) and (-,+ ), there is also evidence of negative market reactions for banks in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Malta, and Spain and positive market reactions for banks in Austria. However, there is no evidence of reaction for these banks during a (-,+ ) window. Table suggests a similar picture for the reactions in the CDS market. e CDS spreads of French, Spanish, and Dutch banks show positive reactions over longer windows.
As pointed out before, before the results of the Comprehensive Assessment were published, several banks increased their capital position by issuing equity or subordinated debt (like CoCos). Notably banks situated in the periphery did so. Table shows the market reactions to the announcement of extra capital issuance by some of these banks. e results suggest some market response, notably for banks located in the periphery. Two Italian banks display a strong reaction in stock prices but not in spreads. e negative sign for stocks could be due to dilution e ects that frequently occur a er extra capital issuance. Stock prices of Banco Comercial Portugues increased following the announcement of capital issuance.
Finally, we have examined the CARs of those banks that had a shortfall according to Acharya and Ste en ( a). ese authors report higher capital shortfalls under their alternative stress test. If such expectations had been priced in, the publication of the outcomes of the Comprehensive Assessment may have surprised nancial markets. As Table shows , the publication of the results of the assessment did not a ect the stocks and spreads of most of these banks. Only for three Italian banks and one Austrian bank do we nd (mixed) reactions. Whereas stock prices of Banca Carige and Banca Monte dei Paschi decreased, stock prices of Credito Emiliano and Erste Bank increased. CDS spreads of all banks were not a ected.
Discussion and conclusions
We have studied the market reactions to the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment considering their e ects on stock returns and CDS spreads. Our ndings indicate that the announcement of the assessment had no sigAn example is the news on the decline of the IFO business climate index to a two-year low in October suggesting that the German economy may face a di cult nal quarter of (Wagstyl, ). An argument in favour of using longer event windows is that it could capture delayed market reactions. However, in longer windows market volatility due to other news may be picked up. For example, for the French banks in Table , the decrease in stocks for longer event windows seem to be driven by investors' pro t-taking a er gains in the run-up to the publication of the Comprehensive Assessment (Reuters, ) and not so much by the results of the stress test. Still, at the time the leverage ratio was not a regulatory measure so it may also be argued that markets would therefore not be a ected by shortfalls calculated on the basis of this measure.
ni cant e ect on stock prices of banks and CDS-spreads in the full sample. If we groups banks at the country level, we nd some evidence for a market response in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Our results suggest that also the publication of the results had no signi cant e ect on stocks or CDSspreads in our full sample for our standard event window of (-,+ ), i.e. three trading days. On a country level, however, we nd some evidence of stock market reaction for Austrian, Irish, and Portuguese banks and reactions in CDS spreads for German banks. Considering longer event windows ( to trading days) we nd (mixed) market reactions in the stock markets of Austrian, Belgian, French, and Spanish banks. Similarly, longer windows lead to evidence of reactions in the CDS markets for French, Dutch, and Spanish banks.
Although our results suggest that the immediate market e ects of the Comprehensive Assessment are limited, at least for some banks the assessment has led to increased transparency, as markets responded to the provision of new information. Our nding of a limited market response can be interpreted in two ways. Either, nancial market participants had no con dence in the assessment and therefore decided to ignore the publication of its results, or the outcomes of the assessment were in line with market expectations. Although our results cannot rule out the rst explanation, in view of market analysts' reactions to the publication of the assessment, we believe that the second interpretation is more likely. e success of the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment is not primarily determined by short-term market responses. As a result of the exercise, the ECB knows more about the current state of the banks and can use this information in implementing its new responsibility for bank supervision in the Eurozone. Due to the Comprehensive Assessment several banks have enhanced their capital base which may enhance nancial stability. Interestingly, some banks which did not have a capital shortfall under the Comprehensive Assessment raised new capital, illustrating that banks' capital management is not only a ected by regulatory measures but also by other considerations, such as internal targets and market opportunities. Table  Comprehensive assessment : list of considered banks per country and banks with capital shortfall Notes: is table shows the list of banks in our analysis as well as the subset of banks that did not pass the Comprehensive Assessment. e columns "Stock data" and "Spread data" indicate whether listed banks had respectively stock or CDS data available. "Shortfall" denotes the size of the capital gap the banks have (in billion e). "Shortfall a er raised capital" denotes banks that still have to cover their capital shortfall (also in billion e) a er the release of stress test results.
Tables

Country Bank
Stock data Spread data Shortfall Shortfall a er capital raised Notes: *** -** -, * -signi cance level. is table shows the largest stock issuances going back up to months prior to the release of the results of the stress test. We list only those banks that were included in the Comprehensive Assessment. Column "Size" indicates the size of the capital issue (in bln e). Type "A" and "R" denote "Additional" and "Rights" respectively. e nal columns indicate the reaction of the stock (in ) and CDS markets (in bp) to the announcement of capital issuance. 
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